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This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with 
monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending 
the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous 
firms framework of Gros (JIE, 1987). The optimal tariff internalizes a markup distortion and a 
terms of trade externality. It is larger the higher the dispersion of firm-level productivities, 
and the bigger the country's relative size or relative average productivity. Furthermore, in the 
two-country Nash equilibrium, tariffs turn out to be strategic substitutes. Small or poor 
economies set lower Nash tariffs than large or rich ones. Lower transportation costs or smaller 
fixed market entry costs induce higher equilibrium tariffs and larger welfare losses relative to 
the case of zero tariffs. Similarly, cross-country productivity or size convergence increases the 
global welfare loss due to non-cooperative tariff policies. These results suggest that post 
WWII trends have increased the relative merits of the WTO. 
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Hohenheim. 1 Introduction
So far the literature has analyzed optimal taris in abridged versions of the Melitz (2003) trade
model with heterogeneous rms. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) have provided analytical
results for the small economy case; Cole and Davis (2011) derive optimal taris in a model with
quasi-linear preferences. While these papers have considerably enhanced our understanding of
policy in new trade models, their assumptions preclude modeling non-cooperative Nash equilibria
between two large economies or rule out general equilibrium eects. In this paper, we provide
an analytical characterization of non-cooperative tari policy in an asymmetric one-sector two-
country Melitz (2003) model.
Gros (1987) has studied optimal taris and the two-country Nash equilibrium for the Krug-
man (1980) model of monopolistic competition and trade in dierentiated goods. This paper
extends Gros (1987) to the case of rms diering with respect to productivity. While markup
pricing provides a rationale for import taris beyond the conventional terms-of-trade argument
(Johnson, 1953), rm-level productivity heterogeneity may work against taris. The reason is
that taris protect inecient rms which would otherwise not survive international competition.
This leads to a lower level of productivity of the average domestic rm. Allowing for rm hetero-
geneity therefore has a qualitative and quantitative bearing on the analysis of optimal taris and
the two-country Nash equilibrium. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) show for the small
economy case that the markup distortion dominates, ensuring the existence of an optimal tari.
They do not study how this eect interacts with the terms-of-trade channel and what it implies
for the two-country Nash equilibrium.
Understanding the incentives of governments to use commercial policy is important for any
assessment of the potential welfare gains due to an institution such as the Word Trade Orga-
nization (WTO). With this objective, the present paper studies non-cooperative tari policy,
retaliation, and welfare in a heterogeneous rms trade model of the Melitz (2003) type where
trade is due to product dierentiation, producers operate under conditions of monopolistic com-
petition and increasing returns to scale, and international trade is subject to transportation
costs. This setup enjoys massive empirical support on the micro level (the market entry decision
2of heterogeneous rms) and on the macro level (aggregate trade ows).1
We present the following results. (i) In a large country, holding market shares xed, the
optimal tari rises in the elasticity of substitution across varieties and falls in the degree of
productivity dispersion; it increases in the relative size of the country and in the freeness of
trade (variable and xed trade costs). Moreover, it can be analytically bounded below and above.
Quantitatively, the terms-of-trade externality has similar inuence on the size of the optimal
tari than the markup and consumer surplus distortions. (ii) Countries' reaction functions are
negatively sloped, i.e., taris are strategic substitutes. Retaliation leads to a new equilibrium
tari that is lower than the optimal tari of a country in the non-retaliation case. (iii) Lower
variable trade costs and lower xed costs of foreign market access lead to higher taris in
the Nash-equilibrium, while the convergence of country sizes and average productivities lead
to higher tari-induced world welfare losses relative to free trade. Hence, the Melitz (2003)
framework suggests that a multilateral trade agreement such as the Word Trade Organization
(WTO) has become more important in avoiding the welfare damages due to tari wars as the
world has become more symmetric and natural trade barriers have fallen. Our results on import
taris carry over to policy measures such as the provision of subsidies on the consumption of
domestic varieties or ad valorem export taxes. The rst policy measure is hard to implement
in practice, and the second is rarely observed. Given the overwhelming empirical relevance of
import taris, we focus on them in the subsequent analysis.2
Our research is related to at least two important strands of literature. The rst deals with the
endogenous determination of trade policy and the role of the WTO. The literature distinguishes
between two general motives for commercial policy: to protect the interests of special lobbying
groups (owners of specic assets, trade unions), see Grossman and Helpman (1994), or to simply
maximize national welfare. Following Gros (1987) and the ensuing literature, in the present
paper, we choose the second option and characterize the ad valorem tari that maximizes Home's
1See Bernard et al. (2007a) for a survey on rm-level evidence and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008)
for evidence on aggregate trade ows.
2Details of the derivation of optimal consumption subsidies and export taxes are available upon request. Recent
literature also considers optimal xed cost subsidies. P uger and S udekum (2009) focus on optimal entry xed
subsidies in a model with two large countries and two sectors. Jung (2011) derives optimal entry and operating
xed cost subsidies in a small open economy setting with a single dierentiated good sector.
3welfare. Maggi and Goldberg (1999) nd that the weight of welfare in the government's objective
function is many times more important than the weight of special interests, so that our approach
seems sensible. It is also consistent with the empirical evidence presented by Broda et al. (2008)
who show that countries use taris to exploit their market power on international markets.3
Recently, Ossa (2011) has shown a novel motivation for import taris when a homogeneous rms,
dierentiated goods sector is complemented by a numeraire sector with costless transportation
of goods, perfect competition and linear technology. In such a framework, wage rates are xed
by technology. There is a new and interesting rationale for import taris, as these allow the
country to attract additional rms into the sector aicted by trade costs. If this tari-induced
delocation eect dominates the direct import price eect of the tari on the ideal price index,
consumers benet.4 However, in our single-sector setup, additional entry of rms bids up the
wage rate, counteracting the delocation eect. Our paper relates to research on the WTO
since it sheds light on the role of exogenous trends (country size and productivity convergence,
declining transportation costs) in the shaping relative welfare losses due to non-cooperation.5
We simulate simple scenarios that are motivated by real-world trends such as the convergence
of GDPs across countries and the fall in transportation costs in order to understand how those
trends aect countries' incentives to use taris.
Second, our paper relates to research on asymmetric versions of the Melitz (2003) model.
Falvey et al. (2006) as well as P uger and Russek (2010) are examples of papers that derive
analytical results under the presence of a numeraire good and (in the latter case) quasi-linear
preferences. Our paper is also related to Arkolakis et al. (2011) who work with a more standard
version of the core model. None of the mentioned papers investigates optimal trade policy.
We appear to be the rst to provide an analysis of endogenous import taris in full-edged
asymmetric Melitz (2003) model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model -
3Recent literature also addresses dierent incentives for government interventions. Antras and Staiger (2011)
focus on international cost-shifting incentives in a framework with oshoring and contractual imperfections.
Mrazova (2011) considers prot shifting in a world with oligopolistic competition.
4See Bagwell and Staiger (2009) for a more general discussion of the delocation argument.
5See Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Tomz et al. (2007). Bagwell and Staiger (2010) survey
recent theoretical and empirical literature on the functioning of the WTO.
4essentially a version of the Melitz (2003) model with two asymmetric countries and Pareto-
distributed rm level productivities. Section 3 studies the eects of a given tari on model
outcomes. Section 4 characterizes the optimal tari given the other country's tari rates, and
section 5 analyzes the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash game between tari-setting countries.
Section 6 contains our quantitative analysis and section 7 concludes. Analytical details are
relegated to an Appendix.
2 Model setup
We consider a world with two countries that dier with respect to their labor forces and average
productivities but are otherwise structurally identical. Each worker supplies one unit of labor
inelastically and spends income on domestic and imported varieties of a dierentiated good.








; 0 <  < 1; i 2 fH;Fg; (1)
where 
i is the set of varieties available in country i, q [!] is the quantity of variety ! consumed,
 = 1=(1   ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, H denotes Home and F Foreign. The price





1  d!: Then, demand for any variety is
q [!] = RiP 1
i p[!]
  ; (2)
where Ri denotes aggregate expenditure.
Labor is the only factor of production. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
rms, who hire workers on a competitive labor market at wage wi: Firms pay xed setup costs
wife; thereafter they obtain information about their productivity level ' which is sampled from
a Pareto distribution Gi ['] = 1   (bi=')
 with bi the lowest possible productivity draw and
 > 2 the shape parameter. A higher value of bi is associated to a higher mean, but leaves the
coecient of variation constant.6 A higher value of  comes with a lower coecient of variation.








and the coecient of variation
5A rm from country i pays xed market access costs wifij to access consumers in the other
market. The marginal costs of a producer with productivity ' are wi=': Given the demand
function (2), the price charged (at the factory gates) by that rm is wi=('): As usual, we
assume that there are symmetric iceberg trade costs ij = ji  1; where ii = 1: Moreover,
country j imposes a tari on imports from country i tji, where tii = 1. Operating prots of a
rm from country i on market j are RjP 1
j t 
ji ('=ijwi)
 1 = wifij. We denote by '
ij the








= wifij; i 2 fH;Fg; j 2 fH;Fg: (3)
This is the zero cuto prot condition (ZCP). As is customary in this literature, we restrict
exogenous parameters such that '
ij > '
ii for all i and j: Then, only the most productive rms sell
to the foreign markets. Moreover, rms with ' < '
ii do not even sell on the domestic market and
remain inactive. Hence, if Me
i is the mass of entrants in country i; then Mi = (1   G['
ii])Me
i
denotes the mass of active rms. The mass of exporters is then simply Mij = mijMi where the















the scale parameter bi:










; i 2 fH;Fg; (4)
where parameters are restricted such that   =(   (   1)) is strictly positive. Note that
the scale parameter aects price levels only indirectly through endogenous variables mji;Mj and
'
ji.
Expected prot from entering is given by  i  E [(')] = (   1)wi
P
j mijfij (see Ap-
pendix 8.3). Free entry requires that expected prots are equal to entry costs discounted by the
probability of successful entry, i.e.,  i = wife
i =(1   G['
ii]): Using the Pareto distribution and
1=
p
 (   2):








i ; i 2 fH;Fg: (5)
This is the free entry condition (FEC). Since entry costs and expected prots are both
proportional to wi; wages drop out from this equation. Expected entry costs depend negatively
on bi but expected prots do not depend on bi: So, a higher value of, for instance, bH would
require either or both cutos '
HH;'
HF to increase.















  ; i 2 fH;Fg; (6)
where (5) has been used to substitute out the term
P
j mijfij:
The trade balance condition (TBC) requires that Home's aggregate imports from Foreign
are equal to its aggregate exports to Foreign. Average sales  rij of a rm located in i from selling
to j is given by  rij  E [r(')] = wimijfij (see Appendix 8.2). Assuming fHF = fFH = fx,
fHH = fFF = fd, fe
H = fe
F = fe and using the wage in Foreign, wF; as the numeraire, one
may write wHMHFfx = MFHfx; or, equivalently, wHmHFMH = mFHMF: Using (6) and













Tari revenue is redistributed in a lump sum fashion to consumers.7 The balanced budget
condition implies that aggregate expenditure Ri is the sum of expenditure spent on domestic








7In the homogeneous rms model, Ossa (2011) shows that accounting for tari income is important to guarantee
nite levels of optimal taris. Schr oder and Srensen (2011) parameterize the eectiveness of redistribution.
7The second equality follows from using the balanced trade condition and inserting the expression
for average sales.
Equilibrium is determined by 4 zero cuto prot conditions, 2 free entry conditions, 2 labor
market clearing conditions, 2 balanced budget conditions, and the balanced trade condition.
3 Eects of a given tari
Before turning to the welfare-maximizing tari policy of a country, we consider the impact of
exogenous changes in a given import tari on equilibrium.
Domestic expenditure and revenue shares. For the subsequent analysis, it turns out
useful to dene the share of revenues earned domestically as
i 
Mi rii





We obtain the second term from using the expressions for average sales and the labor market
clearing conditions. The share of domestic revenues is larger, the smaller the export participation
rate mij. Similarly, we write the share of expenditure spent on domestic varieties as
~ i 
Mi rii





where we have used  rji = wimijfij and the balanced trade condition wimijMi = wjmjiMj to
substitute for wj=wi.
Comparing equations (9) and (10) shows that for a country that does not impose an import
tari, the revenue and expenditure shares coincide. The reason is that Home's imports equal
Foreign's exports due to the balanced trade condition. A positive tari tij > 1 drives a wedge
between Home's expenditure on imports and Foreign export sales: One fraction of Home's
expenditure on imports goes to Foreign rms, the other fraction is Home's tari revenue. The
balanced trade condition, however, links the imports of a country evaluated at ex-factory prices
to its export sales. Thus, a positive tari results in a domestic expenditure share that is smaller
8than the domestic revenue share, i.e., ~ i  i. The inequality holds strictly for tij > 1.
Within-industry reallocation and the relative wage. Holding Home's aggregate expen-
diture and its price index xed, an increase in Home's import tari raises the import cuto
productivity level '
FH; see the zero cuto prot condition (3).8 A tari makes imported vari-
eties more expensive, which leads to decline in demand and lower export sales for Foreign rms.
Thus, the least productive Foreign exporters become purely domestic rms.
The import-selection eect also occurs if we take into account general equilibrium adjust-
ments. In order to see this, we write Home's import cuto condition given by equation (3)
relative to its domestic cuto condition in totally dierentiated form (holding trade and xed
costs constant)
(^ '
FH   ^ '
HH) + ^ wH   ^ tHF = 0; (11)
where ^ x = dx=x denotes a percentage change of variable x. If we had perfectly elastic labor
demand as in Ossa (2011), i.e., ^ wH = 0, the relative import cuto had to carry the full burden
of adjustment to an import tari increase. In the absence of perfectly elastic labor demand, an
increase in Home's relative wage dampens the eect on the relative import cuto. With perfect
substitutes, i.e.,  ! 1, the change in the relative import cuto will be smaller. In the absence
of rm heterogeneity as in Gros (1987) or with perfect complements, i.e.,  ! 0, we would only
see an adjustment of the wage rate.
Home's domestic entry '
HH cuto is negatively linked to Home's export cuto '
HF through
the free entry condition (5). For the average rm with a xed domestic cuto, a lower export
cuto increases the probability of exporting and therefore raises expected export sales. In order
to restore a zero net value of entry, the probability of successful entry must decline, which implies










where the share of domestic revenues i is dened as in equation (9).
8Recall that Foreign's wage wF is chosen as the numeraire.
9Home's export cuto '
HF is linked to its relative wage and its import cuto through the
balanced trade condition (7)
^ '





With perfectly elastic labor supply, there is a one-to-one match of changes in Home's import and
its export cuto. Inelastic labor supply results in asymmetric adjustment of these two cutos.









where we assume that Home takes Foreign's tari tF as given (^ tF = 0). With xed Foreign
aggregate expenditure and price index, there is a positive link between Home's export cuto
and its wage. In general equilibrium, however, we have to take into account changes in Foreign's
aggregate expenditure and Foreign's price index.
Totally dierentiating equation (8), we obtain
^ RF = ^ MF + ^ wF + (1   ~ F)
 
^ tF + ^ mFH

=  ^ '
FF + (1   ~ F) ^ mFH;
where the second equality follows from (i) the choice of numeraire ( ^ wF = 0), and (ii) the
labor market clearing condition (6). Using equation (12) to substitute for ^ '
FF and ^ mFH =
 ^ '
FH + ^ '
FF, we are left with
^ RF =  




Equation (15) implies that Foreign's aggregate expenditure RF remains constant when For-
eign does not impose an import tari (tF = 1) since then Foreign's domestic revenue and ex-
penditure shares coincide; Foreign's per-capita wage income being xed by choice of numeraire
In the more general case tF > 1, Foreign's aggregate expenditure is aected through changes in
the import volume even if its tari is hold xed. A decline in Foreign's import volume reduces
its tari revenue, resulting in less aggregate expenditure.
Totally dierentiating the expression for Foreign's price index given in equation (4), we






1   ~ F
   1
^ '
HF + (1   ~ F) ^ wH (16)
=
1   ~ F








(1   ~ F)(   1)
   1 + ~ F
^ wH; (17)
where the second line follows from substituting for ^ '
FF by means of Foreign's domestic entry
cuto condition





Using equation (15) and (17) to substitute for respectively ^ RF and ^ PF in Home's export cuto
condition (14), employing (13) and remembering that  = =(    + 1) we obtain
^ wH = H^ '
HF: (19)
The elasticity H is given as   H  =( + F (   )) < . If Foreign is large, i.e., the
domestic revenue share F approaches unity, the elasticity F asymptotically reaches , which
is exactly the elasticity if we xed Foreign's aggregate expenditure and price level. In the other
extreme, F = 0, we have F = .
The elasticity H is decreasing in the share of Foreign's domestic revenues F, and therefore
increasing in Foreign's export participation rate mFH; see equation (9). Using ^ wH = F ^ '
HF,







Given that H < , there is a positive relationship between Home's export and import cuto.
Moreover, the percentage change in the import cuto is translated into a more than proportional
change in Home's export cuto since =(   H) > 1.
Using equations (12), (19), and (20) to substitute for respectively the changes in Home's
















11Since the term in brackets is positive, an increase in Home's import tari raises its import cuto
in general equilibrium.
Let us summarize the within-industry reallocation eects of a small import tari. Two
observations stand out. First, there is reallocation of resources from more productive to less
productive rms. Second, the percentage increase in the export cuto is larger in Home than
in Foreign. This can easily been seen from equation (20). Starting from a symmetric situation
with mHF = mFH, the larger percentage change in the export cuto unambiguously translates
into a change of the domestic entry cuto that is larger in Home than in Foreign. This can be
seen from equation (12).
The average rm reallocates resources from export to domestic activity. This has important
implications for aggregate productivity, which is given by total output (inclusive of loss in transit)











, where  is a positive constant and  > 1. Since
the domestic entry cuto and the export participation rate fall in response to Home's import
tari, aggregate productivity falls in both countries. Starting from a symmetric situation, the
eect is unambiguously larger in Home than in Foreign.
Product variety. A change in the domestic entry cuto translates into a change of domestic
product variety through the labor market clearing condition given in equation (6). A decline
in the domestic entry cuto reduces the productivity of the average rm, resulting in a higher
average price, lower demand, and lower labor input. Full employment then implies that the
mass of domestic varieties rises in both countries ( ^ Mi =  ^ '
ii). Starting from a symmetric
situation, the eect is unambiguously larger in Home than in Foreign.
The change in import variety mjiMj is given by  ^ '
ji. Thus, import variety falls in both
countries in response to an increase in Home's import tari. The eect of an import tari on
total product variety is a priori ambiguous, since domestic variety rises, while import variety
falls.
Trade volume. The change in Home's imports, evaluated at ex-factory prices, is given by
^ MF + ^ mFH =  ^ '
FH < 0: The inequality follows directly from the fact that the variety eect
12dominates the export selection eect.
All these results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 (Eects of a given import tari) An increase in Home's import tari has
the following eects:
a) Home's relative wage rises.
b) The trade volume, evaluated at ex-factory prices, declines.
c) The gap between Home's domestic expenditure and revenue share is widened.
d) In both countries, Home and Foreign, the shares of revenues earned on the domestic market
go up, the domestic productivity cutos decline (anti-selection eect), the export produc-
tivity cuto levels go up (export selection eect), the aggregate productivities fall, domestic
product varieties rise, and import varieties fall. The export selection eect is stronger in
Home than in Foreign. Starting from a symmetric situation, the domestic anti-selection
and the domestic variety eect is stronger in Home than in Foreign.
Proof. In the text.
4 The optimal tari
In this section, we show that a small tari raises Home's welfare to the detriment of Foreign.
Moreover, we characterize the tari that maximizes Home's welfare if it takes Foreign's tari as
given.




















Not surprisingly, welfare is larger the more varieties are available to the consumer (Mi;Mji) and
the cheaper the goods are (higher cutos '
ii and '
ji imply lower prices).
13Welfare directly depends on variable trade costs , but only indirectly on taris. The reason
is that variable trade costs generate loss in transit, which results in an adjustment for the
productivity level of exporters. Taris, on the other hand, are a mark-up on the price of
imports which is redistributed to consumers.
In terms of percentage changes, we have (see Appendix 8.7)
^ Wi = ~ i

^ '
ii + ^ Mi

+ (1   ~ i)

^ '
ji + ^ Mji

= ~ i (   ) ^ '
ii + (1   ~ i)(   ) ^ '
ji; (22)
where we have used the labor market clearing conditions to substitute for ^ Mi. Since  > 1 > ,
the variety eect always dominates the selection eect.
Given that an increase in Home's import tari lowers the domestic entry cutos and increase
the import cutos in both countries, utility achieved from consumption of domestic varieties
increases, whereas utility obtained from consumption of imported varieties goes down.









H   ~ H
H




For a zero tari rate, i.e., tH = 1, the rst term vanishes because in this case the share of
expenditure on domestic varieties ~ H equals the share of domestic revenues H. The second
term is always positive since ~ H < 1. Thus, a small import tari unambiguously raises Home's
welfare. The welfare eect of a further increase is a priori ambiguous because then the rst
term becomes negative.















The strict inequality follows from the observations that F  ~ F and Home's export cuto
increases in response to Home's tari. Thus, Home's welfare gain comes at the expense of
Foreign.
14Characterization of the optimal tari. The rst order condition of Home's welfare max-
imization problem is given by dWH=dtH = 0. Since Home's export cuto monotonically in-
creases in its tari, equation (23) implies that Home's optimal tari TH is determined by
(~ H   H) + HH(1   ~ H) = 0. Substituting for H and ~ H by means of equations (9)








As with homogeneous rms, we cannot solve for the optimal tari in closed form; see Gros
(1987). We can nevertheless discuss the following characteristics of the optimal tari.
The optimal tari is decreasing in Foreign's share of revenues earned on its domestic market,
F. The limiting case F ! 1 implies a lower bound TH = =(  ), which yields the optimal
tari a small open economy imposes.
Recall that F =
 
1 + mFH(fx=fd)
 1. Setting Foreign's export participation rate to unity
and substituting the resulting term back into the the optimal tari formula, we obtain TH =
+fx=fd
  as the upper bound of the optimal tari.9
Foreign's export participation rate mFH = ('
FH='











where we have used the trade balance condition given in equation (7) to substitute for '
FH, the
ratio of the Foreign domestic entry condition and Home's export cuto condition as given by
equation (3), and where Fx  fx=fd denotes export xed costs relative to domestic xed costs,
L  LH=LF is relative country size, and B  (bH=bF)
 is relative productivity.
With a xed wage rate, Home's optimal tari decreases in (symmetric) variable trade costs
 and in Foreign's tari tF and increases in its relative country size L. We show in Appendix
8.9 that these direct eects also dominate if we take the general equilibrium adjustment of the
wage rate into account.
9For reasonable parametrization of the elasticity of substitution and Pareto shape parameter ( = 3:8 and
 = 4) and with f
x=f
d = 1:6, we have (T H   1)  100  22:6% and
 
T H   1

 100  58:7%.
15Proposition 2 (Welfare eects of a tari and characteristics of the optimal tari)
a) A small tari raises Home's welfare at the detriment of Foreign.
b) The welfare-maximizing tari is nite and unique.





 . It is decreasing in variable trade cost  and increasing in its relative country
size L  LH=LF.
d) The best response function is downward sloping.
Proof. In the text.
Quantitative illustration. To gain a sense of the magnitudes involved, Figure 1 illustrates
the impact of a tari on both countries quantitatively. Using a standard parameterization of the
model following Bernard et al. (2007b), we analyze how Home's import tari aects otherwise
identical countries. The following observations stand out. Home's welfare-maximizing tari rate
is 26:4%, a sensible magnitude.10 Foreign's utility unambiguously falls in Home's tari. Average
welfare unambiguously falls. By imposing the optimal tari, Home can increase its welfare level
by 1:36% relative to free trade. At the same time, Foreign's welfare loss amounts to 2:49%.
Home's gain cannot compensate Foreign's loss, such that average welfare falls by 0:56%.
Home's imports, evaluated at ex-factory prices, fall by 37% if Home goes from free trade
to its optimal tari. By balanced trade, Home's exports decline by the same amount. Home's
tari revenue follows the standard Laer curve logic. Notice, however, that the horizontal axis
is rescaled in order include the downward sloping part of the tari revenue curve. The revenue-
maximizing tari rate is close to 80%. Foreign is assumed to allow for free trade, raising no tari
revenue. The drop in aggregate productivity is larger in Home (2%) than in Foreign (1:55%).
The rise in product variety is also stronger in Home (1:82%) than in Foreign (0:79%). Home's
terms of trade improve, while Foreign's terms of trade deteriorate.11
10In all graphs, the optimal tari rate is indicated by an arrow.
11Terms of trade are dened as ratio of the price of exports to the price of imports, weighted by the export
share in production over the import share in consumption; see Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
16Figure 1: Quantitative illustration
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Notes: Countries dier in their tari rates, but are otherwise identical with  = 4; = 3:8; = 1:3, and
f
x=f
d = 1:6. Foreign allows for free trade.
5 Non-cooperative tari policy
In the previous section, we have assumed Foreign's tari on imports from Home to be xed.
Now we allow Foreign to choose an optimal tari, too. Then the setting of taris becomes a
two-player game. The Nash equilibrium in the uncoordinated game is achieved if no player has
an incentive to deviate from the optimal tari. In this section, we show that Nash equilibrium
tari rates exist and are unique. Moreover, we discuss the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium
taris.
Existence and uniqueness. Taris are strategic substitutes. This observations directly fol-
lows from the fact that the best response functions derived above are downward sloping. They
asymptotically reach TH = =(   ) as the other country's tari goes to innity. Moreover,
they are bound from above by TH =
 
 + fx=fd
=(   ): Given these observations, the best
response functions must be strictly convex and must have a unique intersection point. The
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is found at this intersection point.
Figure 2 illustrates the best response functions. The HH curve represents Home's best
response to Foreign's tari tF, whereas the FF curve depicts Foreign's best response function.
17The unique Nash equilibrium is reached at point E. The gure also depicts the asymptotes and
the upper bounds of the best response functions.
Figure 2: The eect of a decline in natural trade barriers on Nash taris
Further characteristics of the Nash equilibrium. Assume for a moment that the two
countries are symmetric. Both countries choose their optimal tari non-cooperatively. In the
resulting Nash equilibrium both countries impose the same optimal tari, i.e., TH = TF  T;

















: Then, the Nash taris are implicitly dened by












where   =(    + 1) > 1. The following observations stand out from equation (26). First,
it is easy to check that the Nash taris decrease in variable trade cost  and in export xed costs
relative to domestic xed costs Fx  fx=fd (see Appendix 8.10). Hence, lower natural trade
barriers and xed cost harmonization lead to higher Nash taris. Figure 2 also illustrates these
18situations. The new best response functions are represented by the dotted lines. The resulting
Nash equilibrium is E0.
Second, the Nash taris are aected neither by a change in relative country size L nor by a
change in relative productivity B. Thus, symmetrically scaling up the world or making it more
productive has no impact on the Nash taris. The welfare level, on the other hand, positively
depends on world population and productivity. The reason is that product variety and average
productivity increase in country size and the productivity bound, respectively. The welfare loss
in percentage terms of non-cooperative trade policy relative to free trade is unaected by the
size of world population and productivity.
All results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (Non-cooperative tari policy)
a) The Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
b) A drop in variable trade costs shifts both best response functions upwards. With symmetric
countries, both Nash taris rise.
c) With symmetric countries, an equiproportional change in population sizes or in productiv-
ities does not aect the Nash equilibrium taris.
d) With symmetric countries, the percentage welfare loss from non-cooperative tari policy
relative to free trade is not aected by equiproportional changes in country size and pro-
ductivity.
Proof. In the text.
6 The relative merits of the WTO in the post WWII world
What is the WTO worth in terms of world welfare gains relative to a situation of non-cooperative
tari policy? And how have these gains evolved given three important stylized facts: (i) trade
costs unrelated to taris (such as transportation or communication costs) have fallen; (ii) coun-
tries have reduced xed regulatory costs on domestic producers more quickly than xed costs of
19foreign market access; (iii) formerly poor Southern countries have emerged on the world economy
and have caught up with Northern countries in market sizes (overall GDPs) and productivities
(per capita incomes). In this section, we relate these observed trends in exogenous variables to
the Nash equilibrium tari levels predicted by the model. In a nutshell, we nd that all these
trends increase the welfare gains of outlawing non-cooperative tari policies. Hence, the WTO
is more important than before.
In a rst scenario, we analyze how a decline in ad valorem transportation costs (natural trade
barriers) from 60% to 30% aects the Nash taris and welfare. Hummels (2007) reports that air
and ocean transport price indices declined by at least 50% from 1970 to 2004. Table 1 reports
the results for two symmetric countries with reasonable parametrization of the elasticity of
substitution and Pareto shape parameter ( = 3:8 and  = 4). Moreover, xed foreign market
access relative to domestic entry xed costs are assumed to be fx=fd = 1:6: The following
observations stand out. First, the Nash tari set by symmetric countries as predicted by our
model are sizable, but their magnitude seems reasonable; see the discussion in Ossa (2011) on
historic tari levels. Second, a decline in variable trade costs, other things equal, results in higher
Nash tari rates. When natural protection disappears, countries substitute for it using articial
trade barriers. However, the substitution is not one-for-one and the eective ad-valorem trade
barriers (the sum of the Nash tari plus transportation costs) falls from 83.5% to 27.7% when
transportation costs fall from 60% to zero. Third, the welfare loss from non-cooperative tari
policy becomes larger relative to the free trade (WTO) case when natural trade barriers fall.
This last observation implies that in a world with shrinking natural trade barriers, the WTO is
relatively more important.
Table 1: Decline in natural trade barriers
Natural trade barriers
60% 30% 0%
Welfare change relative to 60% benchmark n.a. 3.4% 12.7%
Nash tari rate 23.5% 24.6% 27.7%
Welfare change relative to zero tari equilibrium -0.9% -1.6% -3.4%
Notes: Natural trade barriers represent the ad valorem equivalent of variable trade costs.
Two symmetric countries with  = 4; = 3:8; and f
x=f
d = 1:6.
20In a second scenario, we consider dierent types of xed cost deregulation. Stylized facts
discussed in Felbermayr and Jung (2011) suggest that domestic deregulation has proceeded
faster than deregulation of xed market entry costs. Deregulation of entry xed costs does not
aect optimal tari levels. The reason is that a decline in entry xed costs does not aect the
protability of exporting relative to domestic activity. For the same reason, optimal taris do
not change if domestic and foreign market access costs fall in tandem. Lower market access costs
for domestic rms, holding foreign market access costs constant, result in lower optimal tari
levels. The intuition is that reducing domestic market access while leaving foreign market access
unaected, acts as a protective policy. Similarly, deregulating foreign market access, holding
domestic market access costs constant, results in higher optimal tari rates. Table 2 quanties
the eect of harmonization in market access costs.12 Again, non-cooperative trade policy leads
to a welfare loss relative to free trade. Nash taris are increasing in liberalization of regulatory
barriers. Moreover, in a more harmonized world the welfare loss from tari wars are larger.
Table 2: Fixed cost deregulation
Regulatory barriers
200% 150% 100%
Welfare change relative to 200% benchmark n.a. 0.7% 1.7%
Nash tari rate 24.5% 24.6% 24.9%
Welfare change relative to zero tari equilibrium -1.4% -1.6% -1.8%
Notes: Regulatory barriers are measured as xed foreign relative to xed domestic market
access costs, f
x=f
d. Two symmetric countries with  = 4; = 3:8; and  = 1:3.
One key trend of the last decades is the emergence of new players in the world economy.
Using data from the Penn World Tables 7.0, from 1970 to 2007, the share of emerging countries
(all Non-OECD countries except Mexico, Chile, Turkey and those newly created after 1970) in
world GDP has increased from less than 30% in 1970 to almost 50% in 2007. This convergence
trend has accelerated around 1990 and has remained fairly strong since then. In our model, this
fact can be either reproduced by an increase in the relative populations of our two economies,
or by productivity convergence, or by a mixture of the two.
12Exporters must customize their goods to meet the importing country's technical norms, its health, safety, or
environmental norms. Firms undergo costly product labeling and conformity assessment procedures. Harmoniza-
tion means that discrimination of foreign rms is lowered.
21We have shown above that rescaling country size proportionally does aect neither the
optimal tari nor the welfare loss. Table 3 reports the eects of convergence in country size,
holding world population constant. Obviously, the small country's share of world real per-capita
income increases if the size distribution becomes less skewed. Moreover, the Nash tari rates
converge. The large country's Nash tari falls from 29.5% to 24.6%, while the small country's
Nash tari only slightly increases from 23.0% to 24.6%. A tari war harms the relatively small
country much more than the relatively large country. As country sizes converge, the welfare loss
of the world economy becomes more important. Thus, from a world perspective, size convergence
makes the welfare loss of non-cooperative trade policy more severe.
Table 3: Equalization of country size distribution
Small country's population share
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Small country's income share
Free trade 5.8% 14.6% 25.3% 37.3% 50.0%
Nash tari rates
Small country 23.0% 23.4% 23.7% 24.1% 24.6%
Large country 29.5% 27.0% 25.8% 25.1% 24.6%
Welfare change relative to zero tari equilibrium
Small country -7.5% -4.4% -3.0% -2.2% -1.6%
Large country -0.1% -0.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.6%
World level -0.5% -1.0% -1.3% -1.5% -1.6%
Notes: The two countries dier in population size, but are otherwise
identical with  = 4; = 3:8; = 1:3; and f
x=f
d = 1:6. World
population is normalized to 1.
Finally, we consider catching up and convergence in productivities. Table 4 refers to a
situation in which the poor country catches up to the frontier. Catching up is modeled as an
increase in the lower bound of the Pareto location parameter. The poor country's share of
real per-capita income increases. Moreover, Nash taris converge. A tari war harms the poor
country much more than the rich country. Again, the poor country becomes more important as
it catches up, which implies that the welfare loss from a world perspective rises.13
13A limitation of the analysis is that the world becomes richer on average. In Table 5 (Appendix 8.11), we
choose the location parameters of the Pareto distribution such that world real per-capita income is constant,
evaluated in the free trade equilibrium. It turns out that the conclusions drawn from Table 4 carry over to this
scenario.
22Table 4: Catching up
Laggard country's relative productivity
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Laggard country's country's income share
Free trade 18.0% 29.7% 38.2% 44.6% 50.0%
Nash tari rates
Laggard country 23.5% 23.9% 24.1% 24.4% 24.6%
Leading country 26.0% 25.5% 25.0% 24.7% 24.6%
Welfare change relative to zero tari equilibrium
Laggard country -3.8% -2.7% -2.1% -1.8% -1.6%
Leading country -0.5% -0.9% -1.1% -1.4% -1.6%
World level -1.1% -1.4% -1.5% -1.5% -1.6%
Notes: Relative productivity represents the percentage dierence be-
tween the Pareto location parameter of the laggard and the leading
country. The two countries are otherwise identical with  = 4; =
3:8; = 1:3; and f
x=f
d = 1:6. World population is normalized to 1.
7 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to address tari wars between non-cooperative
welfare-maximizing governments in the plain-vanilla heterogeneous rms Melitz model.14 The
framework features a mark-up and an entry distortion as well as a conventional terms-of-trade
eect. These distortions rationalize strictly positive tari rates beyond terms of trade consid-
erations from the perspective of a single country. The framework is tractable enough to allow
for a number of analytical results. We generalize Gros (1987) to the heterogeneous rms case
and Demidova and Rogriguez-Clare (2009) to the case of two large economies. The model pro-
vides an understanding of Nash tari policies when selection eects due to heterogeneous rms
and a rather rich description of non-policy related trade costs are present. Computing counter-
factual non-cooperative taris and the associated welfare eects provides a better quantitative
understanding of the benecial role that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has played. We
discuss the role of big trends, such as falling transportation costs or convergence of market sizes
and conclude that the benets of the WTO might have increased over time.
More specically, we report the following results. First, the optimal tari is bounded from
14That is, without making additional structural assumptions (e.g., assuming an outside sector) or ruling out
the income eect (by choosing quasi-linear preferences).
23below and above. Holding xed market shares, it is decreasing in the mark-up and in the degree
of productivity dispersion. Thus, optimal taris are smaller in in a world with heterogeneous
than with homogeneous rms. Second, changes in variable trade costs and in xed costs of foreign
market access aect the optimal tari in a similar way. Hence, the optimal tari increases in
the freeness of trade. Third, relative country size and relative productivity have similar eects
on the optimal tari. Thus, a rich country imposes a higher tari than a poor country. Forth,
taris are strategic substitutes. Thus, retaliation leads to lower optimal taris than in the
non-retaliation case. Welfare, however, is lower in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than
with zero tari rates for a reasonable parametrization of the model. Finally, higher freeness of
trade leads to higher taris in both countries in the Nash equilibrium, while the convergence of
country sizes results in convergence of taris. In all scenarios, however, the damages to total
welfare on world level due to tari wars increase. Thus, in a world with declining trade cost,
harmonization of market entry regulation, and country size convergence, the WTO has become
more important.
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8.1 The price level
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8.2 Average sales of a rm




























































288.3 Average prots of a rm
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= mijwifij (   1):
Expected prot from entering is given by  i  E [ [']] = (   1)wi
P
j mijfij.
8.4 Mass of a rms
The mass of rms can be found by noting that labor supply Li must equal labor demand
for product development, Me
i fe
i , market access, Mi
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8.5 Derivation of the Foreign's price index in percentage changes
Taking the denition of the price index given in equation (4), using equation (6) and assuming











































































, and employing the denition of ~ F, we end up with (16).
8.6 Derivation of welfare expression





















































































8.7 Derivation of welfare expression in percentage changes
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wifd , the balanced trade condition wimijMi =
wjMji and the denition of ~ i leads to (22).
8.8 Derivation of the optimal tari

























8.9 Characteristics of the optimal tari in general equilibrium
We characterize the optimal tari by adding the optimal tari formula (24) to the system of
equilibrium conditions. As in section 3, we log-linearize the system, but now take exogenous
changes in variable trade costs and country size, into account.
Home's import cuto relative to its domestic cuto. The ratio of Home's domestic and
import cuto conditions (11) generalizes to
(^ '
FH   ^ '






HF + ^ wH   ^ tH   ^  = 0:
Notice that we have used the free entry condition (12).
Balanced trade condition. In changes, the balanced trade condition (13) extends to
^ '








where ^ L = ^ LH   ^ LF is the change in relative country size.












Home's optimal tari. Totally dierentiating the optimal tari formula (24), we obtain
^ TH =  
H

^ F = H (1   F)(^ '






32where we have used ^ F =  (1   F) ^ mFH and the free entry condition (12). Home's optimal
tari unambiguously declines in Foreign's export cuto.
Balanced trade condition, continued. Using Home's import cuto relative to its domestic
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Home's export cuto condition, continued. Using Foreign's domestic entry condition
given in equation (18) and the trade balance condition (13') to substitute for respectively ^ PF

















Substituting for ^ '
FF by means of the free entry condition given in equation (12) and multiplying
both sides with =(   ), we are left with
TH^ '




















Characteristics of the optimal tari. Equations (31) and (32) relate changes in both
countries export cutos to changes in exogenous variables. Using equation (31) to substitute for
33^ '
HF in equation (32), we obtain

THTF   1 +
H (1   F)













The terms in brackets on the left hand side is positive since THTF   1  0: The following
results start out. First, an equiproportional increase in country size does not aect Foreign's
export cuto and thus leaves the optimal tari unchanged. An increase in Home's relative
country size lowers Foreign's export cuto and therefore raises Home's optimal tari if Foreign's
tari rate is positive. Second, a decline in variable trade costs reduces Foreign's export cuto
and raises Home's optimal tari. Third, an exogenous increase in Foreign's tari rate increases
Foreign's export cuto and reduces Home's optimal tari. Hence, Home's best response function
is downward sloping.
8.10 Characteristics of Nash taris
First reformulate equation (26) by multypling the left and right hand side with    






Taking the total dierential with respect to T and t leads to











































348.11 Additional numerical results
Table 5: Productivity convergence with xed world income
Laggard country's relative productivity
4.1% 64.5% 100%
Laggard country's income share
Free trade 4.9% 26.8% 50.0%
Nash tari rates
Laggard country 23.0% 23.8% 24.6%
Leading country 30.1% 25.7% 24.6%
Welfare change relative to zero tari equilibrium
Laggard country -8.6% -2.8% -1.6%
Leading country -0.05% -0.8% -1.6%
World level -0.5% -1.3% -1.6%
Memo: Pareto location parameter
Laggard country 0.082 0.517 1
Leading country 2 1.5 1
Notes: World income is the same across all specications. The two coun-
tries dier in the location parameter of the productivity distribution, but
are otherwise identical with  = 4; = 3:8; = 1:3; and f
x=f
d = 1:6.
World population is normalized to 1.
35